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Abstract
In this paper, we study the welfare implications of the zero-price rule of
the Net Neutrality (NN) regulation in an economy where two competing
Content Providers (CPs) can engage in interlinking agreements. When
CPs link their contents, they attract indirect visitors who rst visit one
CP and then the other so as to benet from the complementarities of
their products. We show that CPs are interested in reaching a linking
agreement when the termination fee set by the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) is not particularly high. The ISP may also nd it protable to set
a low termination fee that leads CPs to reach a linking agreement. First,
it benets from the increase in the Internet tra¢ c, provided that its cost
of transmitting content is not too high. And second, the links increase
the consumerswillingness to pay for the service, which allows it to set a
higher subscription fee. Last, we show the cases in which the regulation
of the termination fee can increase social wefare. We also point out that
when the ISPs transmission cost is su¢ ciently low the imposition of the
NN principle is justiable, although this is a su¢ cient, but not a necessary,
condition for welfare maximization.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, an important percentage of the visits received by Content Providers
(CPs) in the Internet is originated in other web sites. For instance, direct visits
to The Washington Post and The New York Times represent only 25% and 44%,
respectively, of their total tra¢ c, whereas the rest of tra¢ c is originated in social
platforms and search engines, or is referral from other news sites such as blogs.
Similarly, direct visits to social platforms like Facebook and Twitter represent
61% and 55%, respectively, of their incoming visits.1 Hence, a key feature of
the Internet economy is that CPs place virtually costless links to third-party
content so as to complement their own product.
Although there is available software to block or undermine the use of links,
most sites usually allow and promote them. The reason is that the indirect tra¢ c
generated by the links constitutes an important source of visits and advertise-
ment revenues.2 In this sense, for example, many online newspapers maintain
formal agreements with other content providers, such as msn.com, in order to
exchange tra¢ c. In the same vein, most social platforms o¤er the option of
promoting the userswebsites on other social networks, and allow users to share
their contents with their social media contacts.
The extended use of links seems to have crucially been encouraged by the Net
Neutrality (NN) principle that governs the Internet. This implies that Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) must equally treat the information packets sent by CPs
and must not charge them any fee. Bourreau & Lestage (2013) explain that the
NN principle implies that:
(i) The ISPs are not allowed to charge CPs an additional fee for terminating
their content to end users (no-pricing rule); and
(ii) The ISPs are mandated to o¤er all CPs the same quality of service,
and thus they cannot prioritize certain types of tra¢ c (no-discrimination and
no-prioritization rule).
In the last years, scholars and policy makers have intensively discussed the
welfare consequences of imposing the NN principle, focusing on its e¤ect on in-
novation and competition.3 Yet, an aspect that has received very little attention
is the e¤ect of this regulation on the use of hyperlinks by CPs. The objective
of this paper is to analyze the impact of a deviation from the zero-price rule on
the linking strategy of CPs and to examine its e¤ect on welfare maximization.
We consider a model in which two competing CPs decide whether to stay
independent or to reach a linking agreement. Without links, users only consume
the content of one CP, whereas links allow them to access the contents of the
1 Information retrieved from Similarweb, a web measurement company.
2Marshall (2007) and Flavián & Gurrea (2009) explain that readers may visit di¤erent news
sites to follow a breaking story or to search specic details about the story. Saez-Trumper et
al. (2013) show that visits to di¤erent sites may be used to obtain alternatives approaches
to the same story or to verify it. Lehmann et al. (2016) nd that providing links to external
content increases engagement and re-engagement.
3See Brennan (2017), Greenstein et al. (2016) and Katz (2017) for a review of the recent
developments of the regulation on NN in the United States and the European Union. For a
review of the economic literature on this topic, see also Schuett (2010) and Faulhaber (2011).
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two CPs. As a consequence, links can be viewed as a mechanism to increase the
quality of the service and to attract indirect visitors. CPs obtain advertising
revenues from the tra¢ c they receive and pay a per-unit termination fee to a
monopolist ISP for the network capacity used. The ISP, in turn, sets a xed
subscription fee to Internet users and a termination fee to CPs in order to
maximize its overall prot.
Our rst nding is that CPs have an incentive to reach a linking agreement
provided that the termination fee set by the ISP is not too high. This implies
that NN is su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition to incentivize interlinking
agreements between CPs. In particular, a less restrictive regulation which con-
sists in setting an upper bound for the termination fee would be su¢ cient to
induce the linking agreement. The reason is that CPs nd it protable to lower
the advertisement time included in their contents in order to attract indirect
users, as long as the termination fee is not particularly high. The protability
of the links also depends on the level of complementarity of the contents of the
two CPs.
Second, we identify a trade-o¤ faced by the ISP when setting the termination
fee: on the one hand, a high termination fee allows the extraction of more
surplus from CPs; on the other hand, a su¢ ciently low termination fee induces
the use of links and increases the consumer surplus that can be extracted via
the subscription fee. The optimal strategy of the ISP hinges upon its cost of
transmitting the contents: if this cost is su¢ ciently low, the ISP sets a low
termination fee that allows for interlinking agreements; and if it is su¢ ciently
high it sets a high termination fee that disincentivizes them.
The main policy implication of the paper is derived by comparing the prot-
maximizing and the welfare-maximizing termination fees. We show that when
the ISPs transmission cost is su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high, no regulatory
intervention is needed because the unregulated termination fee maximizes so-
cial welfare. In particular, when the transmission cost is su¢ ciently low, the
privately optimal termination fee incentivizes the linking agreement; and when
it is high, it blocks the agreement. Interestingly enough, in these two cases the
regulation of the termination fee just redistributes rents between the consumers
and the ISP.
On the other hand, the regulation of the termination fee may be required
for some intermediate values of the transmission cost, for which the ISP mainly
nds it protable to set a high termination fee, but social welfare is maximized
with a lower termination fee that increases the number of users who use the
links. The reason is that the ISP does not fully internalize the impact of the
links on the consumers. We explain that, in this context, the imposition of the
NN policy is su¢ cient, but not necessary, provision to reach social optimality.
We last discuss whether some of the assumptions considered in the model
can a¤ect our results. First, we examine the case in which the subscription
fee charged to the end users is capped, which can reect the regulation of the
telecommunications market. In this case, the ISP cannot directly extract the
additional utility that the users obtain with the links, and thus it sets a higher
termination fee that makes the linking agreement less likely. Second, we analyze
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the case where CPs endogenously choose the quality of their contents. We show
that the quality o¤ered by CPs decreases with the termination fee, and that they
invest less in quality when they reach a linking agreement. In this situation, the
ISP uses the termination fee to inuence the quality o¤ered by the CPs and the
tra¢ c they generate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 describes the main characteristics of the model. Section 4
presents the solution of the game when the ISP can freely set the termination
fee and when this fee is regulated. The comparison of these cases allows us
to examine the welfare implications of the NN rule. Section 5 presents some
extensions of the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The proofs of all results
are given in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
The economic implications of the Net Neutrality regulation are of great interest,
given the relevance of the telecommunication sector for the overall performance
of the economy (Katz et al., 2010; Czernich et al., 2011). In the last years, there
has been an intensive policy debate about the e¤ectiveness of Net Neutrality
(NN) to promote welfare, content creation, and the deployment of next gener-
ation telecommunications networks. In this direction, several academic papers
have analyzed the e¤ects of deviating from this rule. According to Krämer et
al. (2013), the Non-Net Neutrality (NNN) scenarios can be categorized into the
"network regime" and "the pricing regime". The former regime corresponds to
a managed network in which the ISPs may employ Quality of Service (QoS)
mechanisms to degrade or block contents which are harmful to the ISPs, as well
as o¤er preferential treatment to the information packets of some CPs (e.g.,
priority arrangements). The latter regime refers to the case in which the ISPs
can engage in two-sided pricing schemes and charge both end users and CPs. It
is thus convenient to separately review these two strands of the literature.
Congestion on the ISPs network results in delays in the delivering of quality
sensitive tra¢ c. This means that giving a preferential treatment to this type
of tra¢ c could generate better e¢ ciency outcomes both from a static and a
dynamic perspective. The research articles analyzing the network regime have
considered the e¤ects of NN on the incentives of the ISPs to expand the capacity
of their infrastructures (Cheng et al., 2011; Krämer & Wiewiorra, 2012), on the
incentives of CPs to innovate (Guo & Easley, 2016), and on the investment
incentives of both ISPs and CPs (Bourreau et al., 2015; Choi & Kim, 2010;
Reggiani & Valletti, 2016). Another group of papers have examined the impact
of a deviation from the NN rule on social welfare (Choi et al., 2015; Economides
& Hermalin, 2012; Peitz & Schuett, 2016; Guo et al., 2017;). Overall, di¤erent
approaches adopted to dene congestion and model rmsstrategic choices yield
di¤erent results about the e¤ectiveness of a managed network to encourage
investments and increase social welfare.
There is also a growing stream of the literature studying the welfare impli-
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cations of deviating from the zero-price rule. Economides & Tåg (2012) analyze
the impact of termination fees on the pricing strategy of a monopolist ISP and
show that implementing network neutrality regulations can be either bene-
cial or harmful for the society depending on the degree of the network e¤ects
for consumers and content providers. Njoroge et al. (2014) and Bourreau &
Lestage (2017) challenge the social optimality of the zero-price rule when two
ISPs compete for attracting end users and content providers. Njoroge et al.
(2014) nd that a non-neutral regime increases the investment levels chosen by
the ISPs and decreases CP participation; but since the rst e¤ect dominates,
social welfare is larger when positive termination fees are allowed. Bourreau
& Lestage (2017) consider a vertically-integrated ISP that provides the non-
integrated ISP with access to its last-mile network at a per-unit access price.
They nd that the termination fee set by the integrated ISP increases with the
access price, whereas the social optimum calls for the net neutrality rule and
cost-based access regulation.
The above articles assume that CPs are local monopolies, and hence they
do not account for the consequences of the deviation from the zero-price rule on
the competition in the content market. Kourandi et al. (2015) and DAnnunzio
& Russo (2015) address this question by explicitly considering two competing
CPs and modelling the impact of the zero-price rule on the emergence of ex-
clusive contracts between ISPs and CPs (i.e., Internet fragmentation). Their
main di¤erence is that Kourandi et al. (2015) treats the termination fee as an
exogenous factor, whereas DAnnunzio & Russo (2015) studies the strategic use
of the termination fees to induce fragmentation. The two papers conclude that
the zero-price rule is not always su¢ cient to prevent fragmentation.4
The main contribution of our paper to this literature is the study of the
welfare implications of deviating from the zero-price rule when CPs can engage
in interlinking agreements. Although hyperlinks are an essential element of the
Internet market, this aspect has been overlooked in the current debate about
NN. In a similar way as DAnnunzio & Russo (2015) and Kourandi et al. (2015),
we explicitly consider competition between two CPs, but instead of studying the
impact of the termination fees on Internet fragmentation we analyze how the ISP
can strategically use the termination fee to a¤ect the interlinking agreements.
From this perspective, our paper can also be related to another recent lit-
erature that has analyzed strategic linking in the Internet market. Katona and
Sarvary (2008) were the rst to analyze competition between web sites in a mar-
ket for advertising links. Mayzlin and Yoganarasimhan (2012) show that links
can be used by bloggers to signal the quality of their contents to consumers.
Dellarocas et al. (2013) examine competition between news sites that obtain
revenue from user visits and that link the contents of their rivals.
In a related paper, Anderson et al. (2017) consider competition between
CPs when end users can either visit only one CP, or rst visit one CP and then
another, where in the latter case they may incur a disutility from the overlapping
4As Broos & Gautier (2017) show, the same outcome can be derived in a setting where
ISPs may nd it protable to exclude competing one-way essential complements (i.e., Internet
applications competing with their own products).
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contents. Our model closely follows this setup, considering that consumers can
single-visit or multiple-visit CPs, depending on their preferences, the attributes
of the contents and the strategic choices of rms. However, we introduce two
important changes. First, in order to represent the Internet market, we consider
that CPs can reach linking agreements that allow them to complement their
contents. As a consequence, consumers click to the links to access contents
that are not o¤ered by the rst visited CP or to access di¤erent versions of the
same content. Thus, visiting several CPs does not necessarily imply either an
overlap in consumption or multiple payments for the same content. Second, we
introduce an ISP that strategically sets the termination fee to inuence the CPs
linking choice. This extension allows us to examine the e¤ects of the NN rule.
In this context, we identify an interesting trade-o¤ faced by the ISP when
setting the prices in the two sides of a fully covered broadband market. In
particular, we show that when the ISPs transmission cost is su¢ ciently low, it
reduces the level of the termination fee in order to induce CPs to reach linking
agreements. This strategy increases total tra¢ c and end userssurplus, which
can be extracted through a higher subscription fee. The relationship between the
termination and the subscription fees resembles the "waterbed e¤ect" identied
by the literature on Net Neutrality in settings where market participation is
endogenously derived (Bourreau & Lestage, 2017; Economides & Tåg, 2012;
Greenstein et al., 2016). In the context of these papers, however, the ISPs
react to the imposition of the NN regulation by increasing the subscription fee,
because attracting more end users becomes less protable.
3 Model description
Consider a market with two Content Providers, CPi with i = f1; 2g, which can
be accessed through the network of an Internet Service Provider (ISP). Following
the model of Anderson et al. (2017), we consider that CPs o¤er a content that
is characterized by its attributes. We denote the universe of possible attributes
that any CP can deliver by ' and dene Qi  ' the set of attributes that
CPi o¤ers. We assume that all attributes have the same intrinsic valuation for
consumers and we normalize the universe of possible attributes to 1. Let Qi be
drawn randomly from ', and qi 2 [0; 1] denote the measure of Qi. Therefore,
an increase in qi translates into a better quality content that makes CPi more
attractive to consumers. For example, if CPi was an online newspapers, then
qi would represent its information coverage. Indeed, online newspapers do not
cover all the events of the day or do not o¤er complete information about each
event. If the CP was a social platform, the attributes could be a set of services,
such as on line communications, the management of private videos and images,
or the provision of breaking news. We consider that the creation of content is
costly and CPs cannot o¤er the complete universe of attributes to consumers.
In addition to their vertical di¤erentiation aspect, the contents of CPs are
also horizontally di¤erentiated. The two CPs compete à la Hotelling and each
of them is located at one extreme of a unit line [0,1], with CP1 located at the
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far left (point 0) and CP2 at the far right (point 1). We further assume that
consumers are uniformly distributed along this line, as well as that the valuation
they place to the content of CPs is increasing in the set of attributes these o¤er.
The model of Anderson et al. (2017) introduces an important modication
to the Hotelling model, which is that the set of attributes o¤ered by CPs inter-
acts with the distance-based utility. Thus, when a consumer located at x 2 [0; 1]
visits only CPi, she obtains an utility (R  tx)qi, where R is the intrinsic valua-
tion generated by the content, and tx is the disutility from imperfect preference
matching, which increases with the "distance" of the consumer from CPi. This
approach implies that the smaller the imperfect preference matching, the higher
the valuation of each additional attribute.
The interaction between horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation well reects
the Internet market, in which an increase in the number of attributes of a con-
tent is not perceived in the same way by all consumers. In particular, the
inclusion of an additional attribute by a CP will be more valued by those con-
sumers who are located closer to that CP. To illustrate this situation, imagine a
digital newspaper that increases its coverage for a particular event. According
to this assumption, the new information will be more valuable for the regular
readers of the newspaper than for the readers of other newspapers. Similarly,
the inclusion of Twitter or Facebook in Youtube channels will be more appre-
ciated by Youtubers rather than for the frequent users of other video-sharing
websites.5
On the other hand, the consumption of each content attribute implies a
disutility ai, which represents the advertisement time embedded into the con-
tent that cannot be avoided by the consumer (alternatively, ai could reect a
direct payment to the CP). In our formulation, the advertisement time, ai, also
interacts with the sets of attributes, qi. This implies that more attributes make
consumers spend more time in the web site of CPs and see more advertisements.
Finally, the consumer also pays a subscription fee, P , to the ISP for accessing
the Internet.
Taking into account this description of the market, we next present the
utility of consumers when CPs do not reach a linking agreement. In this case,
all consumers Single-Visit (SV), which means that they only visit one CP.6 The
net utility that the consumer located at x gains from visiting only CP1; or only
5The interaction between vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation typically benets the
"loyal" consumers of the rm that increases its quality. For example, adding a color screen
to Kindles e-reader is perceived to be more valuable for a Kindle lover than for an iPad
lover (Anderson et al., 2017). Note that this positive relationship does not necessarily mean
that "loyal" consumers are located closer to their favorite rm. In the banking industry, for
instance, depositors located far away from their favorite bank branch place a higher valuation
for the possibility of managing nancial transactions remotely (Degryse, 1996).
6We consider that in the absence of links consumers only visit one CP. This assumption
can be seen as realistic since consumer search for complementary contents in other websites
can be very costly, and because visiting all CPs can entail unwanted overlaps.
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CP2; is the following:
U1 = (R  tx)q1   a1q1   P ;
U2 = (R  t(1  x))q2   a2q2   P: (1)
Content providers compete for consumers, but they can also link each other
to enhance their contents. For example, digital newspapers set links to each
other to complement their coverage on an event. Similarly, Twitter and Face-
book are linked to give users a better communication experience. We consider
that CPs can reach a linking agreement that allows them to o¤er some of the
content of their rivals. Otherwise, they block the use of their contents by the
other CP.
When CPs reach a linking agreement, consumers are allowed to Multi-Visit
(MV), which means that after visiting the web site of a CP, they can click to
the links that lead to the content of the other CP. The additional utility that
consumers can get through the links depends on the degree of complementarity
between the CPsattributes. Following Anderson et al. (2017), we interpret qiqj
as a measure of the overlap of the attributes of CPi and CPj and (1  qi)qj as a
measure of the attributes that are di¤erent in the two CPs with fi; jg = f1; 2g
and i 6= j. Taking this into account, we consider that the incremental valuation
provided by the links is (1  qi)qj +qiqj = qjVi, where  reects the time that
consumers spend on duplicated attributes (alternatively,  can be interpreted
as the proportion of duplicated contents that are linked). If  = 0 consumers do
not obtain any utility from consuming duplicated attributes, whereas if  > 0
they obtain an additional value from consuming the same attribute twice. We
assume that  2 [0; 1) to ensure that an increase in qi does not lead to an
increase in the incremental utility provided by the links.
The utility of the consumer that Multi-Visits (MV) depends on the order of
their visits. The net utility of a consumer located at x when she rst visits CP1
and then CP2, or vice versa, is given respectively by:
U12 = U1 + (R  t(1  x))q2V1   a2q2V1;
U21 = U2 + (R  tx)q1V2   a1q1V2: (2)
According to this formulation, the attributes of the other CP that are linked
generate a disutility to the consumers due to imperfect preference matching.
As as a result, the utility of consumers depend on their location in the unit
line. Also notice that CPs are interested in linking the contents of their rivals
in order to complement their own service. If they do not set links, they can still
receive indirect tra¢ c from their rival, but they become less attractive from the
consumers perspective.
The prot of each CP depends on whether they have reached a linking agree-
ment. Consider rst that they do not reach an agreement, and thus all con-
sumers SV. Dening Di as the aggregate demand for CPi, we can write its
prot as:
Si = Di(ai   f)qi (3)
8
where "S" stands for "Single-Visit". In this prot function, it has been
assumed that for each unit of advertisement time sold, the CP obtains a price,
which is normalized to 1. On the other hand, f is the per-unit termination
fee that each CP pays to the ISP for using its telecommunications network.
This fee may be set by the ISP or it might be regulated. We assume that the
network capacity that CPs buy from the ISP depends on the provided set of
attributes. If they o¤er more attributes (e.g., more news stories, pictures and
videos covering an event), they generate more tra¢ c per user that requires to
contract more capacity from the ISP. Thus, the total payment that CPs make to
the ISP depends on the termination fee, the number of visitors and the number
of attributes they o¤er.
With the linking agreement, CPi gets revenues from its direct and indirect
visitors:
Mi = Di(ai   f)qi +Dji(ai   f)qiVj ; (4)
where "M" stands for "Multi-Visits". In this expression, Di is the mass of
consumers that directly visit CPi, whereas Dji is the number of consumers that
rst visit CPj and then click through to the links to visit CPi. Notice that the
advertisement time per attribute, ai, is the same for direct and indirect visitors.
On the other hand, the existence of links makes CPs to contract more capacity
from the ISP as they have to deliver their contents to both direct and indirect
visitors.
The ISPs revenue comes from the retail market through the subscription fee
charged to all consumers and from the wholesale market through the termination
fee. In particular, its prot is:
ISP = P + fQ  Q2; (5)
where Q = qiDi + qjDj when all consumers choose to SV and Q = qiDi +
qjDj+qiDjiVj+qjDijVi when at least some consumers choose to MV. Note that
the Internet tra¢ c generates a cost to the ISP, Q2, where  > 0 represents the
rate at which the transmission cost becomes marginally more expensive. Taking
this into account, in the next section we analyze how the ISP sets the termination
fee in order to optimize the transmitted tra¢ c. Moreover, given the two-sided
nature of the ISP, we examine the relationship between the termination and
the subscription fees. In what follows, we consider that the subscription fee, P ,
is freely chosen by the ISP, provided that it results in full consumer participa-
tion. This assumption is in line with the current universal service regulation
established in many countries, which requires the a¤ordability of the broadband
access.7
7Notice also that the broadband market is highly mature and its difussion process is
approaching its saturation level. In 2016, 74% of EU homes had a xed broadband sub-
scription, whereas 99% of OECD inhabitants had access to mobile broadband. This sug-
gest that changes in the rms pricing strategies are unlikely to attract a large number of




The objective of this section is to examine the welfare implications of the ter-
mination fee that CPs pay to the ISP for gaining access to its network. We
compare the privately and socially optimal termination fees to determine the
conditions under which the regulation of the market can increase social welfare.
We consider the following timing of the game. In the rst stage, the ISP
sets the subscription fee, whereas the termination fee is either set by the ISP at
its prot-maximizing level or by the regulator at its welfare-maximizing level.
In the second stage, the two CPs make their linking decisions, implying that
they choose whether they reach an agreement to share their contents or not.
In the third and nal stage, CPs decide the advertisement time that they in-
clude in their contents and users make their decisions with respect to content
consumption. We solve the model by backward induction.
4.1 Stage 3: Retail competition
In the third stage of the game, the termination and the subscription fees have
been set and the two CPs have chosen their linking strategy. Taking this into
account, CPs determine the advertisement time embedded into their contents.
In order to derive the equilibrium of this stage, we analyze competition between
CPs when there are not links, meaning that all consumers Single-Visit (SV),
and when there are links, meaning that consumers have the opportunity to
Multi-Visit (MV).
Single-Visit. By equating U1 and U2 in (1) and solving for x we obtain that
the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from CP1 and CP2 is located at
x̂ = R(q1 q2)+tq2 a1q1+a2q2(q1+q2)t . Taking this into account, we can write the demand
of each CP as D1 = x̂ and D2 = (1 x̂), respectively. Based on this information,
CPs set the advertisement time that maximizes the prot function given in (3).
The rst order condition of the prot with respect to ai gives the advertisement




[R(qi   qj) + f(2qi + qj) + t(qi + 2qj)]
Si =
[(R  f)(qi   qj) + t(qi + 2qj)]2
9 (qi + qj) t
(6)
Assuming symmetric CPs (qi = q) the indi¤erent consumer, the advertise-










This result shows that when all consumers SV the termination fee is com-
pletely passed through to consumers via the advertisement time. As a result,
broadband statistics update" at http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/broadband-statistics-
update.htm
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CPs equilibrium prot does not depend on f . On the other hand, from (1) we
obtain that to ensure full participation we need U(x = 1=2)  0, which requires
f  f = R   3t2  
P
q . Specically, f is the termination fee that leads the con-
sumer located at x̂ to be indi¤erent between contracting the Internet service or
staying outside the market. With a higher termination fee this consumer would
not buy at all.
Multi-Visits. When CPs reach an agreement and set links, consumers can
either choose to visit just one CP, or rst visit one CP and then click to the
links that lead to the other. CPs can induce consumers to SV or to MV by
suitably adjusting the advertisement time. Solving U1 = U12 for x, we obtain
that the consumer who rst visits CP1 and then is indi¤erent between visiting
CP2 or not is x̂1 = (a2  R+ t) =t. Similarly, solving U2 = U21 for x shows
that the consumer who rst visits CP2 and then is indi¤erent between visiting
CP1 or not is x̂3 = (R  a1) =t. Finally, solving U12 = U21 for x gives the
consumer who visits both CPs but who is indi¤erent about which one to visit
rst: x̂2 = (t  a1 + a2) =2t. Note that the consumers who are more likely to
SV are those located closer to the extremes of the unit line because they incur a
higher disutility when they click the links and visit the CP located at the other
extreme of the unit line.
The objective of each CP is to set the advertisement time that maximizes
its prot given in (4) when taking into account that D1 = x̂2, D2 = (1   x̂2),
D12 = (x̂2  x̂1) and D21 = (x̂3  x̂2). The rst order condition of Eq. (4) with
respect to ai gives the advertisement time that maximizes the prot of CPi with
i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j:
ai =
t(3 + Vi)(1  Vj) + f(1 + Vi)(3 + Vj) + 2R(Vi + Vj(2 + Vi))
5(Vi + Vj) + 3(1 + ViVj)
;
i =
qi(1 + Vj)(t(3 + Vi) (Vj   1) + 2(f  R)(Vi + (2 + Vi)Vj))2
2t (5(Vj + Vi)) + 3(1 + ViVj))2
: (8)
With symmetric CPs, the solution of this problem yields:
x̂1 = (1  x̂3) =
(f  R+ 2t) (1 + V )
(1 + 3V ) t









q(1 + V ) (t+ (2 (R  f)  t)V )2
2t (1 + 3V )
2 ; (9)
These results imply that CPs share the market equally and that f determines
the number of consumers that SV. Notice that an increase in the termination
fee raises the advertisement time and reduces the number of consumers that
MV (increases x̂1 and reduces x̂3). Unlike the SV case, CPs do not fully in-
corporate the termination cost into the advertisement time in order to attract
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indirect visitors. On the other hand, the prot in (9) negatively depends on the
termination fee.
The optimal level of ai in (9) ensures an interior solution where at least
some consumers SV (x̂1 > 0 and x̂3 < 1) if f > R  2t, and where at least some
consumers MV (x̂1 < x̂2 and x̂3 > x̂2) if f < R  t(3+V )2(1+V ) . Therefore, an interior
solution exist for f 2 [R  2t; R  t(3+V )2(1+V ) ]. The fact that R 
t(3+V )
2(1+V )  f means
that 0 < x̂1 < x̂2 < x̂3 < 1 for every value of f in the interval (R  2t; f ].
When f  R   2t, the advertisement times are so low that all consumers
MV. Taking this into account, the CPsproblem is now to choose ai so as to
maximize the prot in (5) when x̂1 = 0 and x̂3 = 1: Assuming symmetric rms,
the optimal advertisement time and the associated prot are given by:
aMLi = f +
t(1 + V )
1  V ;
MLi =
qt(1 + V )2
2(1  V ) : (10)
where "ML" stands for "Low" values of the termination fee under "Multi-
Visits". Notice, however, that when R   2t1 V < f  R   2t the advertisement
time aMLi is so high that some consumers SV (i.e., x̂1 > 0 and x̂3 < 1). In this
case, the maximum advertisement time which ensures that all consumers MV is
aMMi = R  t. Therefore:
aMMi = R  t;
MMi =
q(R  f   t)(1 + V )
2
: (11)
where "MM" stands for "Medium" values of the termination fee under the
"Multi-Visits" case. In contrast to the previous results, aMMi is negatively
related to t, meaning that when the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation increases,
CPs should reduce the advertisement time to attract all the consumers who
initially visit their rival. Otherwise some consumers SV.8 Finally, notice that
aMLi  aMMi  aMi , which implies that the advertisement time needs to be
smaller (consumers get less disutility) when f  R  2t and all consumers MV.
4.2 Stage 2: Linking decision
In the second stage of the game each CP decides whether to reach a linking
agreement with its rival or not. This decision is based on the comparison of the
prot they obtain under SV and MV. The following proposition summarizes the
CPsoptimal linking strategy.
8When aMMi = R   t, the two CPs are interested in deviating by setting a lower adver-
tisement time when R  2t








2V (1+V ) denote the termination
fee that makes CPs indi¤erent between SV and MV, and ~q denote the set of
content attributes for which f̂ = f . Then, the CPs linking strategy is as follows:
(i) When q  eq, CPs always reach a linking agreement since f̂  f . All
consumers MV for f 2 (0; R   2t], whereas only some consumers MV for f 2
(R  2t; f).
(ii) When q > eq, CPs reach a linking agreement if f < bf , with bf 2
(R   2t; f). All consumers MV if f 2 [0; R   2t] and only some consumers
MV if f 2 (R   2t; bf). For f 2 ( bf; f ], CPs dont reach an agreement and all
consumers SV.
Figure 1: Linking decision. This gure illustrates the second part of Proposi-
tion 1. The continuous red lines represent the equilibrium outcomes under MV
and the dashed blue lines the results under SV. When f > bf , it is satised that
Si > 
M
i and there is no linking agreement. Parameters R = 4:5, t = 1 and
q = 0:75. With SV we consider P = 0. In Panel B we consider  = 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 shows that when q is su¢ ciently small, CPs always
nd it protable to link their contents. In fact, links allow CPs to complement
the limited set of attributes they o¤er. In order to attract indirect visitors from
their competitor, they reduce the advertisement time embedded in each content
attribute, but the advertisement revenue they obtain with this policy is higher
than by blocking the links.
Part (ii) shows that when q > eq, CPs are interested in reaching a linking
agreement provided that the termination fee f is not too high (see Panel A
in Figure 1). On the one hand, they obtain additional revenues by attracting
indirect visitors through a low advertisement time. On the other hand, getting
more consumers increases their overall termination costs. When the termination
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fee is su¢ ciently high (i.e., f > bf), the latter e¤ect dominates, and CPs prefer
to block the links to induce all consumers to SV. If there is not an agreement,
they insert more advertisement time into their contents since they dont have
to attract indirect visitors from the other CP (see Panel B in Figure 1).
Finally, notice that the linking agreement is more likely when there is com-
plementarity between the contents o¤ered by CPs, which implies a positive
relationship between  and bf . The continuous lines in Panel A of Figure 1 show
the prot of CPs with MV when  = 0 and when  = 0:2, whereas the dashed
line shows their prot with SV. Clearly, when the complementarity between
the contents of the two CPs increases, Mi increases, thus leading the threshold
value bf to increase.
The main policy implication of Proposition 1 with respect to the NN rule is
shown in the following statement:
Corollary 1: The linking agreement is always reached when f 2 [0; bf). Net
Neutrality is thus su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for inducing the linking
agreement.
More generally, the proposition o¤ers insights about the incentives of con-
tent providers to reach linking agreements in the Internet market. The links
allow CPs to o¤er more utility to their direct consumers and to attract indi-
rect consumers that generate additional revenue. However, such agreements are
protable as long as the termination cost is not too high.
4.3 Stage 1: Optimal termination fees
4.3.1 An unregulated ISP
Consider next that in the rst stage of the game an unregulated ISP sets the
termination fee, taking into account its e¤ect on the CPs linking decision.
Before analyzing the ISPs optimal termination strategy, we present its prot
under SV and MV.
Lemma 1: The prot of an unregulated ISP is as follows:
(i) If it prefers consumers to SV, it sets fS > bf and obtains SISP = (R  
3t
2 )q   q
2. This strategy can be implemented for q 2 (0:36; 1].
(ii) If it prefers consumers to MV, the termination fee it sets depends on
the transmission cost: when  2 (0; 1), it sets fML = R   2t and obtains
MLISP =
q(1+V )(2R 3t) 2(q(1+V ))2




2(t(1+3V )+2qV (1+V )) ; and when  > 2, it sets f
MH = bf






V , where 1 and 2 are
functions of q given in the Appendix.
The prot of the ISP with SV does not depend on f because there is a
complete pass through of the termination fee from the CPs to the consumers
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through the advertisement time (see Eq. (7)). As a result, the ISP uses the ter-
mination and the subscription fees to extract the consumerssurplus, provided
that full consumer participation is ensured. In spite of this, it must set fS > bf
to induce SV. Notice also that SISP is increasing in q as long as  is not too
large since an increase in the number of attributes increases the tra¢ c, but also
the ISPs transmission cost.
With MV, the termination fee determines the indirect tra¢ c from one CP to
the other, thus a¤ecting the ISPs termination revenue and its transmission cost.
When the cost of transmitting tra¢ c is small ( < 1), it sets f
ML = R   2t,
which is the largest level that leads all consumers to MV. When the cost is
higher (1 <  < 2), it increases the termination fee, inducing CPs to increase
their advertisement time and some consumers to SV. Finally, when the cost is
even higher ( > 2), it sets f
MH = bf , which is the maximum termination fee
that maintains the interest of CPs for the linking agreement. Indeed, with a
larger fee the CPs dont reach an agreement.
Finally, we compare the ISPs prot under SV and MV so as to determine
its optimal strategy.
Proposition 2. The ISPs optimal termination policy is as follows:
(i) When  < b = 2RV (p1+V 1)+t(2p1+V 2 V )2qV 2 , the ISP sets a low termina-
tion fee f < f̂ which leads CPs to reach a linking agreement: if  2 (0; 1), it
sets fML and all consumers MV; if  2 (1; 2), it sets fMM and only some
consumers MV ; and if  2 (2; b), it sets fMH = f̂ and only some consumers
MV.
(ii) When  > b, the ISP sets fS > f̂ which leads CPs to avoid a linking
agreement.
Proposition 2 shows that when  < b the ISP chooses a termination fee
that leads CPs to reach a linking agreement (i.e., f < f̂). The links benet the
ISP for two reasons. First, it obtains more Internet tra¢ c, which increases its
prot as long as the increase in its termination revenue outweighs the increase
in its transmission cost. And second, the links generate an additional utility
to consumers which can be extracted by the ISP through the subscription fee.
Specically, the links make consumers more homogeneous because those that
are located closer to the middle of the Hotelling line are the ones who nd less
costly to visit a second CP. As a consequence, the ISP is able to increase the
subscription fee for all consumers.
The second part of Proposition 2 shows that when  > b, the additional
tra¢ c generated by the links does not compensate the increase in the ISPs
capacity cost. As a consequence, the ISP sets a termination fee that leads CPs
to discard the linking agreement, i.e., fS > f̂ . It is interesting to point out that
the threshold b depends negatively on the degree of complementarity . This
is because a higher  increases the indirect tra¢ c generated by the links which
increases the ISPs capacity costs and makes the agreement less protable for
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Figure 2: ISPs optimal termination policy. This gures illustrates Propo-
sition 2. The continuous red lines represent the equilibrium outcomes under MV
and the dashed blue lines the results under SV. When  > b, it is satised that
SISP > 
M
ISP and the ISP does not induce the linking agreement. Parameters
R = 4:5, t = 1 and q = 0:75. With SV we consider P = 0: In panel B we
consider  = 0:
him. Panel A in Figure 2 presents the prot of the ISP with MV when  = 0 and
 = 0:2, showing that the larger is the degree of complementarity, the smaller
is the threshold value for b.
To sum up, our results show that the ISP can set a low termination fee to
incentivize CPs to reach a linking agreement. The links increase the Internet
tra¢ c, which increases the ISPs prot as long as the transmission cost is low.
When the transmission cost is su¢ ciently high, the ISP sets a termination fee
that blocks the linking agreement between the CPs.
4.3.2 A sector-specic regulator
The previous section studied the privately optimal termination fee charged by
the ISP in an unregulated market. However, nowadays most countries have
adopted the Net Neutrality (NN) rule, which implies a zero termination fee
(i.e., f = 0). Taking this into account, we next analyze the welfare-maximizing
termination pricing in an hyperlinked Internet market, and we discuss the ne-
cessity for the NN regulation. For this objective, we dene Social Welfare
(SW ) as the unweighted sum of consumers surplus (CS) and industry prof-
its: SW = CS + 1 + 2 + ISP .
Next we present the derived SW when consumers SV and when MV in
a context where the regulator sets the termination fee and the ISP sets the
subscription fee.
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Lemma 2: When CPs are symmetric and the termination fee is regulated,
social welfare is as follows:
(i) If society is better o¤ when consumers SV, the regulator sets fSR > bf and
social welfare is SWS = q(R  t4 )  q
2.
(ii) If society is better o¤ when consumers MV, the welfare-maximizing ter-
mination fee set by the regulator depends on the ISPs transmission cost:
when  < 1, the regulator sets f
ML
R  R 2t and social welfare is SWML =
q(4R(1+V ) t(1+3V ) 4q(1+V )2)
4 ;
when 1 <  < 2 , he sets f
MM
R =
(2q(1+V ) t)(t(1 V )+2RV )
(1+V )(t+4qV ) and the society
obtains SWMM = q(V (4qt+(t 2R)
2) t(4(q R)+t))
4(4qV+t) ; and
when  > 2 , he sets f
MH














; where 1 and 2 are functions of q given in the Ap-
pendix.
The economic intuition of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 1. Social
welfare with SV is independent of f since the ISP adjustes the subscription fee to
the regulated termination fee to ensure consumersfull participation. Indeed, in
this case an increase in the termination fee reduces CS by the same amount that
increases the ISPs prot. With MV, the termination fee determines the indirect
tra¢ c from one CP to the other. Like the privately optimal termination fee, the
welfare-maximizing one depends on the ISPs transmission cost. When the cost
is low ( < 1), the regulator sets a low fee (f
ML
R ) which induces all consumers
to MV. For higher values of the capacity cost (1 <  < 2 ), he increases the
termination fee (fMMR ), which in turn increases the CPsadvertisement time and
reduces the number of consumers that MV. Finally, with a higher transmission
cost ( > 2 ), the regulator is forced to limit the value of the termination fee
(fMHR ) to avoid inducing CPs to block the links.
Finally, the following proposition compares the social welfare levels under
SV and MV in order to determine the optimal termination policy.
Proposition 3. The welfare-maximizing termination policy is as follows:







, the regulator sets f < f̂ , and CPs
reach a linking agreement: if  < 1, he sets f
ML
R  R  2t and all consumers
MV; if  2 (1; 2), he sets fMMR and thus only some consumers MV; and if
 2 (2; ̂R), he sets fMHR and only some consumers MV.
(ii) When  > ̂R, the regulator sets f
S
R >
bf to induce all consumers to SV.
The proposition shows that the socially optimal termination policy follows
a similar pattern as the privately optimal one. In particular, when the trans-
mission cost is higher than ̂R, the use of links is so costly for the society that
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the regulator sets f > bf to induce all consumers to SV. By contrast, for lower
values of the transmission cost, the regulator reduces the termination fee so as
to induce CPs to reach a linking agreement.
Finally, we analyze the conditions under which the regulatory intervention
is necessary for implementing the socially optimal outcome.
Corollary 2.The regulation of the termination fee is only necessary for  2
[1; 2] and [bR; b]. The imposition of the Net Neutrality principle could be
justied only when  2 [1; 1], even though it represents a su¢ cient, but not a
necessary, condition for increasing social welfare.
Putting together the results of Propositions 2 and 3, we deduce that when  is
su¢ ciently low, both the unregulated ISP and the welfare-maximizing regulator
set f  R   2t which leads all consumers to MV. Specically, in a regulated
market the regulator sets f  R   2t when  < 1, whereas the unregulated
ISP sets f = R   2t when  < 1. Given that 1 < 1, we conclude that the
two scenarios generate the same level of social welfare for  < 1. However,
the regulation of the termination fee is needed when 1    1 because an
unregulated ISP would set a higher termination fee. This situation is illustrated
in Figure 3.
On the other hand, when  is su¢ ciently high, the privately and the socially
optimal termination policies generate the same welfare level because f > bf , and
thus all consumers SV. Notice that the regulator sets f > bf when  > bR and
an unregulated ISP for  > b. Since bR < b, we conclude that the two cases
generate the same social welfare level for  > b. Therefore, the regulation of
the termination fee is needed when bR    b because fSR > fMH . In this
interval of the transmission cost the regulator prefers to block the links because
they generate a reduction in the consumer surplus that is not internalized by
the ISP. Indeed, the links allow the unregulated ISP to increase the subscription
fee.
For intermediate values of the transmission cost ( 1 <  < ̂R) we obtain
the following results: the unregulated ISP sets fMM if  2 [1; 2) and fMH = bf
if  2 (2; ̂R], whereas the regulator sets fMMR if  2 (1; 2) and fMH = bf
if  2 (2; ̂R). Given that 2 < 2, we conclude that the regulation of the
termination fee is only required for [1; 2].
In summary, the maximization of social welfare requires the regulation of
the termination fee when  belongs to the intervals [1; 2] and [bR; b]. In the
other cases, the private and social incentives with respect to the termination
fee are aligned. Also notice that when  2 [0; 1], the imposition of the Net
Neutrality principle (f = 0) leads to the maximization of social welfare, but
similar results could be obtained with a less restrictive regulation that imposes
f  R   2t. In fact, for this level of the transmission costs the regulation of
the termination fee only a¤ects the distribution of the rents between the ISP
and the two CPs. Finally, it is interesting to highlight that the socially optimal
termination fee is strictly positive for  > 1. In this case, the adoption of the
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Net Neutrality rule will be detrimental for social welfare because it induces all
consumers to MV which ine¢ ciently increases the Internet tra¢ c.
Figure 3: Equilibrium results with and without the regulation of the
termination fee. The dashed blue lines show the case with the socially optimal
termination fee and the continous red lines the case with the privately optimal
fee. Parameters R = 4:5, t = 1 and q = 0:75. With SV we consider P = 0.
5 Discussion
Our previous analysis showed that an unregulated ISP may strategically reduce
the termination fee in order to induce CPs to reach a linking agreement. We next
argue that this incentive could be a¤ected by its ability to dene the subscription
fee. Moreover, we discuss how the termination fee a¤ects the linking agreements
when the CPs endogenously choose the number of attributes they o¤er.
5.1 The role of the subscription fee
Proposition 2 showed that when the ISPs transmission cost is su¢ ciently low,
the ISP chooses a low termination fee to induce CPs to reach a linking agree-
ment. The reason is that the links increase the Internet tra¢ c and they generate
an increase in the utility of consumers that can be extracted with the subscrip-
tion fee. It is important to point out, however, that this e¤ect depends on the
ability of the ISP to exert its market power in the retail market. If the subscrip-
tion fee was capped, for example due to a strict regulation, then the ISP would
set a higher termination fee in the MV case, and hence CPs would be less likely
to reach the linking agreement.
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Proposition 4. When the subscription fee is capped and lower than the
prot-maximizing one, the ISP sets a higher termination fee which blocks the
linking agreement for lower values than b.
This result highlights the important relationship between the subscription
and the termination fees in two-sided markets. The relevance of this relation-
ship has already been highlighted in the literature on Net Neutrality (see, for
instance, Shi¤ 2008; and Greenstein et al., 2016), which explains the presence
of a "waterbed e¤ect" whereby telecommunications operators can raise the sub-
scription fee if they are imposed to establish a zero termination fee.9 In models
in which consumersparticipation in the market is endogenously determined,
the imposition of the zero-price rule leads to an increase in the subscription fee,
because the ISP is not interested in attracting new consumers that generate no
termination revenue. In our model, a di¤erent situation emerges since a reduc-
tion of the termination fee may induce the establishment of a linking agreement,
which allows the ISP to set a higher subscription fee. In this context, Proposi-
tion 4 shows that the interest of the ISP to induce a linking agreement depends
on its ability to modify the subscription fee. Thus, for example, when the sub-
scription fee is capped, the ISP is less interested in reducing the termination fee
to make the linking agreement more attractive for the CPs.
5.2 Endogenous number of attributes
In the previous section we have considered that the quality and the number of
attributes o¤ered by CPs is an exogenous factor. However, in some cases CPs
may be able to choose the attributes of their contents. For example, MSN has
gradually included a variety of services to its web portal, such as Outlook.com,
Messenger and Bing that compete with other content providers. On the other
hand, digital newspapers can decide the number of news stories and videos they
dedicate to a particular event. To consider this case, we imagine a game with
the following timing. First, the ISP sets the termination and the subscription
fees. Second, the two CPs decide whether to reach a linking agreement. Third,
the CPs determine the number of attributes of their contents. And nally, CPs
establish the advertisement time.
To increase the number of attributes, CPs must incur a cost kq
2
i
2 , where k is
the rate at which increasing the number of attributes becomes marginally more
expensive. For simplicity, we assume that k  t. The following result shows
that CPs choose a di¤erent number of attributes when they deny and when they
reach a linking agreement.
Lemma 3. CPs choose q = 1 for low values of f and k, and they reduce
the number of attributes as these costs increase. The number of attributes is
larger with SV than with MV.
9The "waterbed e¤ect" can be dened as the e¤ect whereby regulation of one price of a
"multiproduct" rm causes one or more of its unregulated prices to change as a result of the
rms prot-maximizing behavior (Schi¤, 2008).
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Content providers invest less in new attributes when the termination fee
increases because, in this case, o¤erring a better quality content is not so prof-
itable. They also invest less when they reach a linking agreement because, in this
situation, they can complement their contents with those of the other CP, and
thus they compensate the lower quality content by obtaining indirect visitors
through the links.
We next derive the CPs linking strategy by comparing their prot under
SV and MV.
Proposition 5: The CPs reach a linking agreement for f 2 (R  t 2k; bfe).
The intuition of this proposition is that CPs reach an agreement if the cost of
creating new attributes is not too low (i.e., f > R  t 2k) and the termination
fee is not too high (i.e., f < bfe). Panel A in Figure 4 shows the combinations
of values for f and k that make CPs reach an agreement. The two conditions
are represented with a plain line, and they cross each other for k = t=2. When
k > t=2, CPs reach an agreement if the termination fee is in the interval f
2 (R  t  2k; bfe), which increases with k. If CPs reach an agreement, they set
q < 1 to save costs, but the links allow them to attract indirect visitors. On
the other hand, if f > bfe the termination fee is so high that CPs dont nd it
protable to use links to attract indirect visitors. As a consequence, they just
o¤er their contents, increase q, and include more advertisement time in their
contents.
Finally, we study how the ISP chooses the termination fee in the rst stage
of the game, taking into account its impact on the CPs linking decision and in
the number of attributes they commercialize. In the Appendix we derive the
prot functions of the ISP when it induces SV and MV, and in Panel B of Figure
4 we show a numerical representation of the results. We obtain that the ISP
induces CPs to MV for low values of , and that the termination fee increases
with  (see the continuous line). When   1e, it sets fMLe = R   2t. As a
consequence, CPs reach a linking agreement and all consumers MV. For larger
values of  the termination fee increases and only some consumers MV: when
 2 (1e; 2e) it sets fMMe , and when  2 (2e; be) it restricts the termination
fee to fMHe = bfe so as to make CPs indi¤erent between SV and MV. The
increase in the termination fee reduces the number of attributes created by the
CPs. Finally, for  > be the ISP sets fSHe > bfe to block the linking agreements
and reduce the Internet tra¢ c (see the dashed line).
To sum up, when the number of attributes o¤ered by CPs is set endogenously,
the ISP sets a termination fee that induces CPs to reach a linking agreement
when the transmission cost is low, and to stay separate when this cost is su¢ -
ciently high. This represents a similar pattern to that found in Proposition 2,
where the number of attributes is exogenous.
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Figure 4: Endogenous number of attributes. Panel A shows the constel-
lation of parameters for which CPs choose MV. Panel B shows the equilibrium
termination fee set by the ISP. Parameters R = 5, t = 1 and k = 0:75.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the welfare implications of the Net Neutrality
(NN) regulation in an economy where Content Providers (CPs) can link to each
others content. Our model considers a fully covered market where two CPs
compete for end users and can be accessed through the network of an Internet
Service Provider (ISP). The ISP charges a termination fee to the CPs for using
its network and a subscription fee to the end users for accessing the Internet
service.
We have found that CPs have an incentive to reach a linking agreement when
the termination fee set by the ISP is not too high. The reason is that they nd
it protable to lower the advertisement time included in their contents in order
to attract indirect users as long as the termination cost is not particularly high.
The main implication is that the NN policy is a su¢ cient, but not necessary,
condition to incentivize interlinking agreements between CPs.
Our ndings also reveal that the ISP can strategically use the termination fee
to promote or to disincentivize the linking agreements, and hence to inuence
the Internet tra¢ c. This is an aspect that has been overlooked in the economic
literature on NN, although it can have important consequences in the structure
and organization of the Internet market. Specically, we have shown that the
ISP sets a low termination fee that incentivizes the interlinking agreements
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between the CPs when its transmission cost is su¢ ciently low. On the contrary,
for higher transmission cost levels, the ISP increases the termination fee in order
to block the use of links. This pricing policy is favored by the two-sided nature
of the Internet market. Indeed, a low termination fee induces CPs to link their
contents, which increases the surplus that can be extracted from the end users
via the subscription fee. In this way, a monopolist ISP can compensate the
lower termination fee with a higher subscription fee, provided that the increase
of Internet tra¢ c is not too costly.
An inverse relationship between the termination and the subscription fees
(the so-called "waterbed-e¤ect") has already been identied by the NN litera-
ture in models where the consumer participation in the market is endogenously
determined. In these models, the imposition of the zero-price rule leads the ISP
to increase the subscription fee, which reduces the participation of consumers.10
Our model shows that a di¤erent trade-o¤ generating the same results can
emerge in a fully covered hyperlinked Internet market. Specically, a low ter-
mination fee leads CPs to link their contents and allows the ISP to increase the
subscription fee to extract the additional surplus obtained by consumers.
Finally, this paper has identied the conditions under which the regulation of
the termination fee can improve social welfare. In our model, the privately and
the socially optimal termination fees result in the same welfare level when: (i)
the transmission cost is so low that leads to such a low optimal termination fee
that induces all consumers to use the links; and (ii) the transmission cost is so
high that leads to such a high optimal termination fee that blocks the links. Only
when the transmission cost takes intermediate values, the welfare-maximizing
and the prot-maximizing termination fees may not be aligned and the regu-
lation of the termination fee may be necessary. In this situation, the adoption
of the Net Neutrality rule can be justiable in some specic cases, although it
still represents a su¢ cient, but not a necessary, condition for increasing social
welfare.
There are several aspects of the Internet market which have not been consid-
ered in this paper but that it would be interesting to address in future research.
First, the presence of competing ISPs is frequent in the Internet market and
raises new questions that should be further examined. For example, competi-
tion for attracting CPs may lead ISPs to reduce their termination fees, but it
can also favor the fragmentation of the Internet market. Kourandi et al. (2015)
have shown that in these cases, the application of a zero-price rule is neither a
su¢ cient nor a necessary policy instrument to prevent fragmentation, whereas
it can even be detrimental for social welfare. Taking this into account, future
research could examine the welfare implications of the NN rule on Internet frag-
mentation in the presence of hyperlinks.
Second, the establishment of di¤erent termination fees for di¤erent content
providers is an aspect that could be applied in practice. The characteristics
10As Greenstein et al. (2016) point out, "given the opportunity to charge CPs for termina-
tion, the ISP is more willing to decrease the subscription fee to end users, precisely because
more end users can be attracted to join the platform, resulting in more transactions with CPs
that are protable for the ISP too".
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of the contents o¤ered by CPs would play a crucial role in such case. For
instance, quality sensitive contents may call for a costly priority lane. In this
context, referral tra¢ c could be priced higher than direct tra¢ c, or could be
considered as non-prioritized. Similarly, ISPs could be interested in setting
di¤erent termination fees for referral tra¢ c originated in di¤erent CPs.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. When f 2 [0; R 2t], CPs decide whether to reach a
linking agreement by comparing their prot when all consumers SV and when
all consumers MV. When f 2 [0; R  2t1 V ] the comparison of the prot functions
in Eqs. (7) and (10) shows that ML > S , and when f 2 (R  2t1 V ; R 2t] the
comparison of the prot functions in Eqs. (7) and (11) shows that MM > S :
On the other hand, when f 2 (R 2t; f ] the comparison of the prots in Eqs.
(7) and (9) shows that MH > S when f < bf = R   t((V 2 1)+(1+3V )p1+V )2V (1+V ) .
Since bf > (R  2t), we deduce that in the interval f 2 (R  2t; bf ] CPs reach an
agreement that leads some consumers to MV and the rest to SV.
Finally, let ~q denote the level of q which makes f̂ = f . When q  ~q, we
obtain that f̂  f , which means that CPs always prefer the linking agreement.
When q > ~q, we observe that f̂ < f , which implies that CPs reach an agreement
for f < f̂ and do not reach it for f 2 [f̂ ; f ].
Proof of Lemma 1:
Single-Visit: Imagine that the ISP sets a termination fee that induces
CPs to block the links (f > f̂). With symmetric CPs, the ISPs prot in (5)
simplies to SISP = P + fq   q2. This expression is increasing in f , but
the maximum fee that the ISP can set to ensure full consumer participation is
fS = f = R  3t2  
P




)q   q2: (12)











. Since P can not take negative values, we conclude
that SV can only be implemented when q 2 (0:36; 1].
Multi-Visits. Consider that CPs reach a linking agreement (f  f̂). When
0  f  R   2t1 V all consumers MV. In this case, the ISPs prot in (5) can
be written as MISP = P +Qf   Q2 = P + q(1 + V )f    (q(1 + V ))
2. Taking
into account that the ISP must guarantee that all consumers participate in the
market (i.e., U(x = 1=2)  0), from (2) and the advertisement time in (10) we
obtain that the subscription fee must be P = q(1+V )((2f(V 1) 2R(V 1) t(3+V ))2(1 V ) .
Substituting this fee in the prot we obtain the following expression, which does
not depend on f :
MISP =
q(1 + V )((3 + V )t  2R(1  V ))
2(V   1)    (q(1 + V ))
2
: (13)
Imagine now that R   2t1 V  f  R   2t, which still implies that all con-
sumers MV. As before, the ISPs prot is MLISP = P +q(1+V )f  (q(1 + V ))
2.
From (2) and the advertisement time in (11) we obtain that full consumer par-
ticipation requires P = qt(1+V )2 . Substituting this fee in 
ML
ISP we get that the
prot is increasing in f . Thus, the ISP sets the maximum termination fee that
leads all consumers to MV, which is fML = R   2t. As a result, it obtains the
following prot, which is larger than MISP .
MLISP =
q(1 + V )(2R  3t)
2
   (q(1 + V ))2 : (14)
Finally, consider the case where the ISP sets R  2t < f < f̂ , which implies
that some consumers that are located in the central region of the unit line MV
and those that are at the extremes SV. Given the indi¤erent consumers in (9),
the ISP maximizes MMISP = P + fQ   Q2, where Q = 2qx2 + qV (x3   x2) +
qV (x2   x1) = q(1+v)(t(1 V )+2(R f)V )t(1+3V ) . In this case, from (2) and the adver-
tisement time in (9) the maximum subscription fee that ensures full consumer
participation is P = q(1+V )(2R(1+V ) 2f(1+V ) t(3+V ))2(1+3V ) . Taking this into account,
the termination fee that maximizes MMISP is:
fMM =
(R  t) t (1 + 3V )  2q(1 + V )(t (V   1)  2RV )
2(t(1 + 3V ) + 2qV (1 + V ))
: (15)
Notice that the ISP can set fMM as long asR 2t < fMM < f̂ , which is satis-
ed for 1 <  < 2, where 1 =
R 3t






When  < 1 the ISP sets f
ML = R   2t and obtains MLISP . Moreover, all
consumers MV. When 1 <  < 2 the ISP sets f
MM and the derived prot is:
MMISP =
q(1 + V )(2Rt  3t2 +R2V   2qt(1 + V ))
2 (t (1 + 3V ) + 2qV (1 + V ))
(16)
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Finally, when  > 2 the ISP cannot set f
MM because this will lead CPs
to block the linking agreement. As a result, it sets fMH = f̂ which is the




1 + V   1  2V )t+ V (R
p
1 + V   q(1 + V ))
V
: (17)
Proof of Proposition 2.
In order to derive the ISPs optimal termination policy we compare its prot
under SV and MV.




ISP if  <
2R 3t
2q(2+V ) . Given
that 2R 3t2q(2+V )   1 =
3t+RV





satised in the relevant range of .
(ii) When 1 <  < 2 , it is always satised that 
MM
ISP   SISP > 0.





 < b = 2RV (p1+V 1)+t(2p1 V V 2)2qV 2 . Notice that b   2 > 0, meaning
that MHISP > 
S
ISP for 2 <  < b.
Proof of Lemma 2.




((R  tx)q   a1q)dx+
1Z
x̂
((R  t(1  x))q   a2q)dx  P: (18)




qt; SISP = P   q2 + fq; CSS = q(R 
5
4
t)  P   fq: (19)






q   q2: (20)
Multi-Visits. Under MV, the expression for the consumerssurplus is much

















((R  t(1  x))q   a2q)dx  P: (21)
By substituting the equilibrium outcomes of the retail competition stage
under MV, we nd that SWM depends on the specic value of f set by the
regulator.
From (11) we obtain that when f  R   2t, the prot of the rms and the
consumer surplus level are:
MLi =








tq (1  V )
4
: (22)





(4R (1 + V )  t(1 + 3V )  4q(1 + V )2): (23)
Notice that this expression does not depend on f:




q(1 + V )(t  V (2f   2R+ t))2
2t (1 + 3V )
2 ;
MMISP = P + f(
q(1 + V )(t(1  V ) + 2(R  f)V )
t(1 + 3V )
)
 (q(1 + V )(t(1  V ) + 2(R  f)V )
t(1 + 3V )
)2;
CSMM =
q(3 + V )(2f(1 + V )  2R(1 + V ) + t(3 + V ))2
4t(1 + 3V )2
 q(f  R+ 2t)(1 + V )(4t+ 3f(1 + V )  3R(1 + V ))
t(1 + 3V )2
  P:(24)
As a result, the corresponding social welfare function is SWMM , which we
dont show here for simplicity. The rst order condition of SWMM with respect
to f yields:
fMMR =
(2RV + t(1  V ))(2q(1 + V )  t)
(1 + V ) (t+ 4qV )
: (25)
This solution is valid as long as R   2t < fMMR < bf , which is satised
for 1 <  < 2, where 1 =
R t








 < 1, we nd that f
MM
R  R 2t, and thus social welfare is as in (23). When
1 <  < 2, the regulator sets f
MM
R and the society gets:
SWMM =
q(4qt+ (t  2R)2   tq (t+ 4(q R))
4 (4qV + t)
: (26)
Finally, when  > 2, the regulator sets f
MH
R =
bf to ensure that CPs reach




1 + V ) + 2(R  q(1 + V )(1 +
p







Proof of Proposition 3. We compare social welfare under SV and MV.
(i) When  < 1, the comparison of SW
ML and SWS shows that SWML >
SWS for  < (4R 3t)4q(2+V ) . Since
(4R 3t)
4q(2+V )  1 =
t(1 V )+2RV
4q(2+V 2)+12qV > 0, we deduce that
SWMM > SWS for the relevant interval of .
(ii) When 1 <  < 2 , we nd that SW
MM   SWS = q(4q 2R+t)
2V
4(t+4qV ) > 0.
(iii) When  > 2 , we conclude that SW







, where bR > 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. For simplicity, assume that  = 0 and consider
that the value of the subscription fee is capped. Under SV, the ISPs prot
SISP = (R  3t2 )q q
2 does not depend on P and f . Under MV, all consumers
MV if f  R   2t . Since MLISP = P + (2  q) qf   q2 (2  q)
2 is increasing
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in f , the ISP sets efML = R   2t to maximize its prot and gets eMLISP =
P +(2  q) q((q  2)q+R  2t). When R  2t < f < f̂ , the ISP sets f so as to
maximize MISP = P + fQ  Q2, where Q is dened as in Proposition 2. The
optimal termination fee is now:
efMM = (4(2  q)(1  q)q + (4  3q)t) (2(1  q)R+ qt)
4(1  q)(2 (2  q) (1  q) q + (4  3q)t) (28)
and the ISP gets eMMISP . Comparing the results with those of Lemma 1 (Eq.
15), we obtain that efMM > fMM . Indeed, when P is chosen by the ISP, it
sets a lower termination fee and uses the subscription fee to extract part of the
consumerssurplus created by the links. Finally, we nd that R 2t < efMM < f̂
for e1 <  < e2, where
e2 = 2p2  q(1  q)R  (8  (6 + qp2  q)t2q(2  3q + 2q) : (29)
This implies that for  > e2 the termination fee efMM is so high that CPs
dont reach a linking agreement. In this case, the ISP sets efMH = f̂ to induce
MV, and obtains eMHISP . Also notice that e2   2 = 2p2 qt4(q 1)q < 0.
Finally, notice that bf should result in eMHISP < MHISP , since MHISP considers
the prot maximizing P . Taking this into account, and dening e as the value
for which SISP = eMHISP , it must be that e < b.
Proof of Lemma 3. The fourth stage of the game in which CPs choose
the advertisement time is as in Section 4.1. Hence, we initiate our analysis by
considering the number of attributes they o¤er with SV and MV. For simplicity
in this proof we assume that  = 0, which implies that V = 1  q.
Single-Visit. Under SV, CPi chooses the attributes qi that maximize the
prot in (6), which now includes the cost of increasing the number of attributes,






2 :The rst order condition of ie with
respect to qi, and after assuming symmetric rms, yields:
qSH =




(4(f  R) + 11t)(4(R  f) + t)
288k
: (30)
The expression for qSH shows that the quality is decreasing in f . When
f  4R+t 12k4 CPs choose q
SH  1 and the prots are SHe . When f < 4R+t 12k4
there is a corner solution where qSL = 1 and CPs obtain SLe =
(t k)
2 .
Multi-Visits. When CPs reach a linking agreement, it can be that all or
just some consumers MV. Imagine rst that all consumers MV, i.e., f  R 2t.
In Section 4, we obtained that for f  R   2tq , the advertisement time in (10)
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Importantly, this expression is decreasing in qi, but the quality cannot be below
qi =
2t
R t if we want to ensure that all consumers MV. Substituting this value
in the advertising time we get aMLie = R  t.
Imagine now that R   2tq < f  R   2t. From (11) we know that with





symmetric rms we obtain:
qMM =
2 (R  f   t)
(R  f   t+ 2k) ;
MMe =
2k (R  f   t)2
(R  f   t+ 2k)2
: (31)
Observe that this solution holds as long as qMM < 1, which happens for
f 2 [R   2k   t; R   2t). When f 2 (0; R  2k   t) there is a corner solution
with qML = 1. Indeed, f and k are so low that CPs choose the highest possible
number of attributes and get SLe .
Finally, consider that f > R   2t, which implies that only some consumers
MV. From (8) we obtain that the advertising time is
aMHie =
f(2 qi)(4 qj)+2(4 qi(2 qj) 3qj)R+(4 qi)qjt
3qiqj 8qj 8qi+16 . As a result, from the prot







The rst order condition of MHie with respect to qi, after considering sym-
metric CPs, yields qMH , a long solution that we dont show for simplicity.
Likewise, we dont present the resulting expression for MHe .
With the above expressions we can compare the qualities with SV and MV.
First notice that qSH ; qMM and qMH are decreasing with f (results for qMH
are obtained numerically). On the other hand, we nd that qSH > 1 for f <
4R+t 12k
4 and that q
MM > 1 for f < R   t  2k: Considering that the number
of attributes is decreasing in f and that k  t, we obtain that qSH equals 1 for
a larger value of f than qMM , and that qSH  qMM . Finally, notice that qMH
reaches its maximum value for f = R  2t, in which case it is as qMM , but both
are smaller than 1.
Proof of Proposition 5.
From the proof of Lemma 3 we obtain that with SV the prot of CPs is:
(i) When f 2 [0; 4R+t 12k4 ], they set q
SL = 1 and obtain SLe .
(ii) When f 2 ( 4R+t 12k4 ; f ]; they set q
SH = 4(R f)+t12k and obtain 
SH
e .
With MV their prot is:
(i) When f 2 [0; R  2k   t], they set qML = 1 and there is no MV.
(ii) When f 2 (R  2k   t; R  2t], they set qMM and obtain MMe .
(iii) When f 2 (R  2t; f ], they set qMH and obtain MHe .
To derive the CPs optimal linking strategy, we compare their prots under
SV and MV. The next results are useful to identify the prot functions that
have to be considered for each value of k:
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(1) ( 4R+t 12k4 )   (R  2k   t) =
1
4 (5t  4k) > 0, which implies that for
f 2 (0; R   2k   t) the relevant prot with SV is SLe and that in this interval
there is not MV.
(2) ( 4R+t 12k4 ) (R 2t) =
3
4 (3t  4k), which is positive if k <
3t
4 . Therefore,









e , and in f >
4R+t 12k
4
we compare SHe and 
MH
e
11 . On the other hand, when k  3t4 in the interval




e , in f 2 ( 4R+t 12k4 ; R 2t)
we compare SHe and 
MM
e , and in f > R  2t we compare SHe and MHe :
Taking this into account, we nd the following results:
(i) For k  t2 , CPs always choose SV and obtain 
SL
e . Indeed, for k  t2
the region f 2 ( R   2k   t; R   2t] doesnt exist. Moreover, in f 2 (R   2t; f)
numerical simulations show that SLe > 
MH
e .
(ii) For t2 < k <
3t
4 , CPs choose MV in the interval f 2 (R   2k   t; bfe),
where e 2 f1; 2g. Indeed, in f 2 (R 2k t; R 2t) we obtain that MMe > SLe ;




e if f  bf1, and in f 2 ( 4R+t 12k4 ; f)
we obtain that MHe > 
SH
e if f < bf2.
(iii) For 3t4  k < t, CPs choose MV in the interval f 2 [R   2k   t; bfe],









e , and in f 2 (R   2t; f) we
nd that MHe > 
SH
e for f < bf2.
Results for bfe can only be obtained through numerical simulations and are
shown in Panel A of Figure 4.
Results for Figure 4. We examine how the ISP sets the termination fee
when q is endogenously determined. First we derive its optimal termination
policy with SV and MV, and then we compare the results.
Single-Visit. As seen in Proposition 5, when the ISP sets f < R   t   2k
and f > bfe, CPs do not reach an agreement. From (6) we deduce that the ISPs
prot is SISP = P + qf   q2. As full consumer participation is ensured with
P = (R  3t2  f)q
SH , this function simplies to SISPe = (R  3t2 )q
SH (qSH)2,
where qSH = 4(R f)+t12k . The rst order condition of the prot function with
respect to the termination fee yields:
fSHe =







Notice that an interior solution requires that fSHe > bfe. Otherwise, the ISP
sets fSLe = bfe and gets SLISPe. Also note that it must be that fSHe > 4R+t 12k4 .
11Note that f   4R+t 12k
4
> 0 for k > k (when P = 0 we nd that k = 7t
12
). Hence, when
t=2 < k < k with SV the CPs sets qSLe = 1 and get 
SL
e in the interval f 2 [0; f ] . When
k  k there is an interval f 2 [ 4R+t 12k
4




Indeed, for lower values, CPs set qSL = 1 and the ISP gets SLISPe = R  3t2  :
This happens for   2R 3t4 .
Multi-Visits. When the ISP wants to induce MV, it should set f 2 (R  
t  2k; bfe). When f 2 (R   2k   t; R   2t), CPs set aMMe = R   t and qMM =
2(R f t)
(R f t+2k) , and all consumers are induced to MV. Taking this into account,
from (2) the ISP sets P = (2 q)tq2 to guarantee full consumer participation and
maximizes MLISPe = P + (2  q)qf   q2(2  q)2. The numerical analysis shows




When f 2 (R  2t; bfe), CPs induce some consumers to MV, while the others
SV. In this case, CPs set aMHe as in (8) and q
MH . From (2), we obtain that the
ISP sets P = (2 q)q(2(2 q)(R f) (4 q)t)2(4 3q) to ensure full consumer participation
and maximizes MMISPe = P + fQ  Q2, where Q =
(2(R f)(1 q)+qt)(2 q)q
(4 3q)t . The
solution of this problem is fMMe , which can only be obtained numerically, and
the ISP gets MMISPe. Also notice that R   2t  fMMe  bfe is satised for
1e    2e, where the value for 1e and 2e are obtained numerically. When
fMMe >
bfe, the ISP sets fMHe = bfe to guarantee that all consumers MV, and it
obtains MHISPe.
We can now compare the prot of the ISP with SV and MV. Panel B in
Figure 4 shows the optimal termination fees when parameter values are R = 5,
t = 1 and k = 0:75. When   1e, we obtain that MLISPe > SLISPe and as result
the ISP sets fMLe = R   2t. When 1e <  < 2e, we nd that MMISPe > SHISPe





 < be. Thus, when 2e <  < be; the ISP sets fMHe = bfe and for  > be it
sets fSHe .
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